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Introduction 
Following the bombing of the Moscow Metro in early February 2004, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, responding to U.S. President George Bush's expression of condolences and solidarity with 
Russia, stated in a letter to Bush that Russia would remain a "stable, reliable and predictable" 
partner for the U.S.[1] Yet a review of the Russian record under Putin raises questions about the 
Russian president's assertion. This essay, after briefly analyzing the central thrust of Putin's 
domestic and foreign policies, will examine four areas of possible U.S.-Russia cooperation in the 
Middle East: 1) the war on terrorism; 2) the Arab-Israeli conflict; 3) Iraq; and 4) Iran, to determine 
whether, in fact, Russia has been a reliable partner for the U.S. in the past and could be in the 
future. 
Putin and his policies 
One of the most striking aspects of the Putin presidency has been his ability to bring quasi-
independent players in Russian domestic and foreign policy under much tighter centralized 
control. Putin has all but eliminated the political influence of oligarchs and taken over their media 
outlets. He has also replaced the head of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, who had a habit of trying 
to make nuclear deals with Iran not approved of by the Kremlin and the director of the powerful 
gas monopoly, GASPROM, heavily involved in Turkey and Central Asia, and the leader of the 
Defense Ministry. Putin also changed interior ministers, set up plenipotentiaries to oversee 
Russia's 89 regions, and consolidated Russia's arms sales agencies into Rosoboronoexport in an 
effort to gain greater control over a major source of foreign exchange. He also put a great deal of 
emphasis on improving Russia's economy, not only through the sale of arms, oil and natural gas 
(the Russian economy has been blessed with high oil and natural gas prices during much of his 
first four years in office) but also by expanding Russia's business ties abroad. Indeed, business 
interests have played an increasingly significant role in Putin's foreign policy. 
 
Making Putin's task easier was the support he received from the Duma, especially from his 
Edinstvo (Unity) party—now the enlarged United Russia Party—in contrast to the hostile relations 
Yeltsin had with the Duma from 1993 until his resignation as Russia's President in December 
1999. Indeed, in the Duma elections of December 2003, Putin greatly increased his support, 
weakening both the communist and liberal parties that were his main opponents. 
 
Overall, Putin's central foreign policy aim has been to strengthen the Russian economy in the 
hope that, in the not too distant future, Russia might regain its status as a great power. In the 
interim he has sought to create an "arc of stability" on Russia's frontiers so that economic 
development can proceed as rapidly as possible. In theory at least, such a goal would appear to 
require a policy of increased cooperation with the economically advanced West. 
 
At the same time, however, mindful of voices in the Duma—now represented most strongly by the 
Rodina (Motherland) Party that had been created by the Kremlin to weaken the Russian 
Communist Party—as well as in the security apparatus and the Russian Foreign Ministry 
unhappy at Moscow's appearing to play "second fiddle" to the U.S. after 9/11, Putin has from time 
to time asserted an independent position for Russia, as Moscow's behavior during the recent war 
in Iraq indicated. Indeed, Russian foreign policy sometimes looks like it is seeking to create the 
"multipolar world" advocated by former Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov, who is now a Putin adviser. Consequently, the tension between these two alternative 
thrusts of Russian foreign policy, cooperating with the U.S. but also competing with it, makes it 
difficult to determine whether Putin's Russia can indeed qualify as a reliable partner of the U.S. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the war on terrorism. 
The War on Terrorism 
There is no question but that Russia proved helpful to the U.S. in its war against Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Russia provided useful intelligence[2] and acquiesced in the 
U.S. establishing bases in Central Asia. Yet it should also be noted that by battling Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban, the U.S. did a major service for Moscow, which has feared radical Islamic penetration 
of Central Asia, which Russian strategists see as the "soft underbelly" of the Russian Federation. 
At the present time Putin has only one major Islamist terrorist problem in Russia—Chechnya. 
Unsuccessful in putting down the increasingly Islamist rebellion during his first three years in 
office, and embarrassed by the Chechen seizure of a Moscow theater in October 2002, in the 
Spring of 2003 Putin embarked on a new policy. This involved a referendum and new elections in 
Chechnya—both of which were seen as bogus by Western and even Russian observers—which 
brought into power in Chechnya a one-time Chechen opponent of Moscow, Akmed Kadyrov, 
whom Putin sought to legitimize in the Muslim world, along with Russian policy toward Chechnya. 
Putin's policy had two elements: 1) a warming of relations with Saudi Arabia, the most influential 
Islamic state and 2) a quest for membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). 
Prior to the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to Moscow in September 2003, Russian-Saudi 
relations were, at best, mixed.[3] Both countries had an interest in keeping oil prices stable—and 
high—but there were occasional tactical disputes on pricing and Russia was reluctant to limit its 
oil production, since it depended on petroleum for one-third of its state revenues. Regardless of 
this common interest, Chechnya soured the relationship. Moscow accused Riyadh of funding not 
only the Chechen rebels, but after 9/11 of funding other terrorist groups as well. Still, when Saudi 
Arabia itself suffered a major terrorist attack in May 2003, Putin seized on the opportunity and 
spoke out on the similarity of that attack to the ones in Moscow by Chechen rebels, stating "the 
handwriting is absolutely identical in both places. And the effect is absolutely comparable."[4] 
 
Putin's speech set the tone for the September 2003 visit of Crown Prince Abdullah. Putin, while 
also seeking—and getting—deals for Russian companies during the visit, had as his major goal 
the gaining of Saudi legitimization for Russian policy in Chechnya. Consequently a meeting was 
arranged between Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, and Chechen 
leader Kadyrov, who stated following the meeting that the Saudis had condemned what was 
happening in Chechnya and said that it had nothing to do with Islam.[5] Kadyrov also was given 
an invitation to visit Saudi Arabia, which he did four months later, reportedly extracting from the 
Saudis promises that their charitable foundations would stop funding the Chechen rebels.[6] 
 
The other element of Putin's policy of securing Islamic legitimization for Russia's policy in 
Chechnya involved courting other key Islamic leaders and if at all possible, gaining membership 
for Russia in the OIC. This effort accelerated during a Putin visit to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 
August 2003. Malaysia was a key country in Putin's strategy because it was to host the next 
Islamic summit in October 2003 and would be the OIC leader until 2006. Besides securing deals 
for the sale of eighteen SU-30 fighter-bombers, Putin obtained the support of the outspoken 
Malaysian leader Muthahir Mohammed for Russian membership in the OIC.[7] 
 
At the OIC meeting in Malaysia in October 2003 Putin made the Russian case for membership, 
noting that the number of Russian mosques had grown from 870 in 1991 to 7,000 in 2003 and 
that the twenty million Muslims "peacefully and productively" living in Russia disproved the theory 
of the clash of civilizations.[8] Putin also brought a number of Russian Muslim leaders to the OIC 
meeting including, of course, Chechen leader Kadyrov. As far as Chechnya was concerned, Putin 
noted that the situation there was "returning to normal" and in not-so-veiled criticism of the U.S., 
stated "some are involved in practicing terrorism. Others are using this situation for their own 
mercenary ends, as a tool of political pressure to achieve their own goals, which have nothing in 
common with the interests of Islam, with protecting human rights, or with international law in 
general."[9] 
 
In examining Russian policy on terrorism, one can see, not unexpectedly, that Moscow was 
primarily following its own interests in the conflict. Exchanging information with the U.S. on 
terrorists and acquiescing in the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia helped Moscow 
subdue an Islamic threat close to its southern borders. On the other hand, Putin's cultivation of 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and other members of the OIC,10 while having the additional benefit of 
securing business deals for Russian companies, had as its primary purpose the legitimization by 
Islamic countries of Russian policy in Chechnya. One must also point out that in his comments to 
the OIC Putin appeared to be seeking to widen the gap between the Islamic world and the U.S.—
not the actions a true partner would take. 
Russia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
From 1953 until the latter stages of the Gorbachev era, manipulating the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
a central aspect of Soviet strategy in the Middle East.[11] Moscow backed the Arab side, claiming 
that Israel was the tip of the American "imperialist wedge" threatening the Arab world. Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, ideology as a factor in Russian foreign policy all but 
disappeared, and Russian national interests became the main factor determining Russian policy. 
At the same time the Arab-Israeli conflict became only tertiary to Moscow's main interests in the 
Middle East, which were Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Nonetheless Moscow's bilateral relations with 
Israel, which had begun to improve in the late 1980's under Gorbachev, took major strides. Trade 
rose to more than one billion dollars annually; Russian Jews could freely emigrate to Israel; there 
were extensive cultural relations with the more than one million Russian-speaking immigrants in 
Israel, making up the largest Russian diaspora outside the Former Soviet Union; and there was 
even military cooperation as Moscow and Tel Aviv cooperated in building an AWACs aircraft with 
Russia providing the airframe and Israel the avionics. Nonetheless, while Moscow during the 
Yeltsin years tended to take a backseat to U.S. diplomacy and took an even-handed position on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, supporting Oslo I and Oslo II,[12] the Russian foreign ministry, which was 
filled with individuals nostalgic about Moscow's ties with the Arabs during the Soviet era, 
increasingly tilted Russian policy toward the Arabs, especially with the outbreak of the Al-Aksa 
Intifada in September 2000. As the U.S. tilted more to Israel, Moscow broke with Washington on 
Middle East diplomacy, choosing (along with the EU) to back Arafat as an important diplomatic 
actor in Arab-Israeli negotiations while both Israel and the United States have rejected him 
because of his links to terrorism. Similarly while the U.S. has shown considerable understanding 
for Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's plans to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip, Moscow has 
rejected Sharon's unilateralism and the construction of the security wall, urging a return to the 
"Road Map" of which Russia was one of the creators. These diplomatic positions together with 
Moscow's supplying of a nuclear reactor to Iran (a sworn enemy of Israel which has called for its 
destruction), with another reactor being negotiated with Syria (another enemy of Israel), have 
considerably soured Israeli-Russian relations under Putin. 
 
Under the circumstances, with Russia no longer seriously cooperating with the U.S. on the Arab-
Israeli conflict—although the all-but defunct road map is still on the diplomatic table—can Moscow 
be considered a serious partner for the U.S. in Arab-Israeli diplomacy? The answer here is in the 
negative although Russia, at the margins, could possibly be helpful in two areas. First it could 
agree to supply troops to the multinational force in the Sinai, thus at least symbolically reinforcing 
the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and freeing up some (but not all) U.S. forces for use in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, were an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement ever to be reached—a 
very big if at the time of writing (February 2004)[13]—Moscow could provide troops for a 
multinational force on the Golan separating Israel and Syria. 
 
In sum, therefore, under Putin Moscow has not proved to be a particularly reliable partner for the 
United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict, although at least at the margins, Moscow could be 
helpful if it provided troops for peacekeeping activities. 
Russia and Iraq 
Prior to the Anglo-American attack in March 2003 that overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein, 
Putin had two central goals in Iraq. The first was to obtain the more than eight billion dollars owed 
to Russia by Iraq. The second was to support the development of major Russian business ties 
with Iraq, especially Moscow's oil companies. Such deals however (other than oil for food 
purchases) could only take place when U.N. sanctions against Iraq were lifted. Consequently 
Moscow energetically pushed for the lifting of sanctions until the war broke out.  
 
Nonetheless as the U.S. moved inexorably closer to war in 2002, Putin faced a clear dilemma—
how to maintain good relations with the U.S., while at the same time protecting Russia's 
extensive business interests in Iraq and its hopes for future contracts there. As the crisis 
deepened, however, Putin saw some benefits flowing to Russia. Oil prices shot up from $25 per 
barrel to an average $38 per barrel, giving Russia an economic windfall. Under the 
circumstances, the Russian leader adopted a dual strategy. First, he sought to prevent the war by 
calling for the UN Security Council to legitimize any decision to go to war. Second, he sought to 
prolong the crisis as long as possible so as to keep the extra income flowing to the Russian 
economy. This, in turn, would keep Russian growth rates high, would enable Moscow to pay off 
some of its international debts (thus enhancing its international investment climate), and would 
provide enough extra spending power to get Putin not only through the Duma elections in 
December 2003 but also through the Presidential election in the Spring of 2004. 
 
Moscow sought to maintain contact with the United States the Hussein regime and, discretely, 
with the Iraqi opposition so that no matter who emerged on top in Iraq, Russia would continue to 
have access to Iraqi oil. Hussein, however, was less than happy with Moscow's policy and, in 
December 2002, canceled the lucrative contract Lukoil had received to develop the West Qurna 
oil field, although he left the contracts with Machinoimport and Zarubzhneft in place. Nonetheless, 
by also floating the possibility of up to $40 billion in new trade deals, he sought to entice Putin to 
give him greater support.[14] 
 
Interestingly enough, as the war approached, U.S.-Russian relations did not immediately suffer. 
In part this was due to the fact that the leading forces opposing a U.S.-British attack on Iraq were 
the French and Germans, and this provided diplomatic cover for Moscow, and in part it was due 
to the fact that the U.S. kept hoping for Russian support, or at least neutrality, during the war, 
hinting that it would in return respect Russia's economic interests in Iraq. Nonetheless, once Putin 
publicly sided with French leader Jacques Chirac, U.S.-Russian ties began to deteriorate.[15] The 
situation was to worsen once the war broke out in late March. Putin, while not being forced to 
veto a resolution calling for UNSC support of the war, because the U.S. decided not to seek such 
a UN resolution, nonetheless spoke out sharply against the Anglo-U.S. attack, calling it the most 
serious crisis since the end of the cold war, and asserting that it was "a direct violation of 
international law, and a major political mistake that could cause the International Security system 
to collapse."[16] Russian-American relations were further hurt by credible reports that Russia had 
secretly sold military equipment to Iraq, including night-vision goggles, anti-tank missiles, and 
devices to interfere with U.S. GPS positioning systems.[17] In addition, the Russian ambassador 
to Iraq accused U.S. forces of shooting at a Russian convoy exiting Baghdad; the Kremlin 
protested a U.S. military spy plane flying over Georgia; and the Duma postponed action on an 
arms control treaty.[18] Putin also, perhaps hoping to further prolong the crisis, demanded a 
cease-fire during the first week of the war, as U.S. forces encountered unexpected resistance.[19] 
 
In seeking to explain Putin's apparent hardening of policy during the war, there are several 
possible explanations. First, with the Duma elections drawing closer, and the Russian public 
strongly against the war,[20] Putin did not wish to leave the issue solely in the hands of the 
opposition communist party, especially since his own party, United Russia, was at the time 
running into problems.[21] Secondly, with the Muslim world opposing the war, Putin may have felt 
that a strong anti-war position could both win Moscow friends in the Muslim world and also 
assuage Russia's twenty million Muslims, many of whom are unhappy with his policy in 
Chechnya. Indeed, Putin asserted, "Russia has a community of twenty million Muslims and we 
cannot but take their opinion into account. I fully share their concerns."[22] Finally, with Germany 
and France also strongly opposing the war, Putin may have felt that the newly created Franco-
German-Russian bloc of states could serve as a check on U.S. unilateralism, and Russian 
opposition to the war would strengthen the prospects of a multipolar world. 
 
In any case, Russian behavior during the war was clearly not that of a partner. This was to 
change in the post war period, albeit only at the margins, and primarily for Russian, not American, 
reasons. Thus immediately after the war Moscow supported the U.S.-sponsored Security Council 
Resolution 1483, which, while leaving the U.S. fully in control of Iraq, did provide a role, albeit an 
unclear one, for the United Nations in the form of special representative, and both lifted sanctions 
on Iraq (except for arms) and noted the goal of the resolution was for the Iraqis to manage their 
own national resources[23]—thus holding out the hope for Moscow that its oil companies and 
business interests could obtain lucrative contracts. 
 
Even though Iraq appeared to be becoming increasingly unstable following the passage of UN 
Resolution 1483, with car bombings and attacks on U.S. forces and the American-supported Iraqi 
police, Moscow continued to pursue its business interests there. Thus, following a call by the 
United States for the countries holding Iraqi debt to waive all or part of it so the country could get 
back on its feet, Moscow responded by offering to waive part of the Iraqi debt—in return for 
contracts for Russian companies. This was achieved during a visit to Moscow by Abdul Aziz Al-
Hakim, head of Iraq's governing council, who noted after discussions with Putin "We received a 
generous promise to write off the debt, or at least part of it." In return, he noted, "We will be open 
to all Russian companies."[24] Immediately thereafter, the Iraqis began negotiations with Lukoil 
on the West Qurna oil field, and Moscow hinted that Russian companies would soon be investing 
in Iraq. In observing Russian behavior, a senior U.S. State Department official commented: 
"At least so far, they're taking a positive approach in the Iraqi debt although they 
obviously have broader commercial interests—which they are articulating 
openly—that they hope will be satisfied at the same time."[25] 
Meanwhile, Russia was already selling to Iraq locomotives, taxis and motorcycles, and in 
February signed a $10 million deal to send Iraq air-conditioned buses.[26] Thus, from Moscow's 
perspective, one of its goals, increased business dealings with Iraq, was being achieved, with the 
promise of more contracts to come; and all this was being done despite Moscow's being banned 
by the U.S. from the first round of Iraqi reconstruction contracts. 
 
In evaluating Russia's behavior during and after the Iraqi war, it is clear that during the war 
Moscow's words and actions made it more of an opponent than a partner of the United States. In 
the post war period, however, by offering to partially lift Iraq's debt and even invest in that 
country—albeit in return for business contracts—Moscow was helping, even in a small way, in the 
stabilization of Iraq, which was a major U.S. goal. Still, this was being done for Russian, not 
American, purposes. 
 
This is another case, as in intelligence cooperation against the Taliban, where the U.S. is helped 
when Russia acts, not to assist the U.S., but to secure it own interests when they coincide with 
those of the U.S. 
Russia and Iran 
Iran, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been Moscow's closest ally in the Middle East, 
and despite some friction over the Caspian Sea, relations grew stronger following Putin's rise to 
power. At the time Yeltsin stepped down as Russia's President, there was a great deal of 
Russian-Iranian cooperation. Russia and Iran were cooperating in maintaining the shaky cease-
fire in Tajikistan, were aiding the Northern Alliance in their battles against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and were jointly supporting Armenia against Azerbaijan, which neither Russia nor 
Iran wanted to emerge as a major force in Transcaucasia.[27] Russia was Iran's primary supplier 
of weaponry, including supersonic jets, tanks, and submarines, and Moscow was also building a 
nuclear reactor complex for Iran at Bushehr. The CIA reported that Russia was also covertly 
aiding Iran in the development of ballistic missiles, such as the Shihab III with a range of 1,300 
kilometers, which could hit U.S. Middle Eastern allies such as Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
There were, of course, problems in the relationship. The first dealt with the division of the Caspian 
Sea. Iran held out for 20 percent—even though its coastline was only 12 percent. Russia, 
however, moved to divide the seabed into national sectors, as indicated by its agreement with 
Kazakhstan in 1998 under Yeltsin and with Azerbaijan in 2001 under Putin. The second problem 
dealt with the routes for the export of Caspian oil and natural gas where Russia and Iran were 
potential rivals. 
 
Putin, by mounting a major military exercise on the Caspian Sea in 2002 following a 2001 clash 
between Iranian gunboats and BP ships exploring for oil, clearly demonstrated that Russia would 
brook no opposition to its primary role there.[28] Nonetheless that has been the only serious 
conflict of interest between Iran and Russia during the Putin era. Iran's tacit support for Russian 
action in Chechnya was probably a factor leading Putin to renege in November 2000 on the 1995 
Gore-Chernomyrden agreement that Russia would cease selling arms to Iran by 2000, once all 
existing arms contracts had been completed.[29] Needless to say, that Russian action angered 
the U.S. and raised questions as to whether Russia could be trusted. 
 
While that was a serious irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, the more pressing issue has been 
Moscow's construction of a nuclear reactor complex for Iran at Bushehr, which the U.S. fears will 
expedite Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons.[30] Washington has offered Russia considerable 
sums of money to forego the project but so far to no avail. The U.S. has also sanctioned a 
number of Russian companies it found dealing with Iran but this has not helped either. In looking 
at Moscow's unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on this issue there appear to be four 
central reasons. First, the sale of the reactor earns hard currency for Russia, and Putin cannot be 
sure that at a time of escalating deficits in the U.S., even if President Bush promised large sums 
of money to Russia, that the U.S. Congress would allocate them. Second, once the first reactor is 
operating, Iran has repeatedly hinted to Moscow that it will purchase up to five additional reactors. 
Third the Bushehr reactor, and the factories in Russia which supply it, employ a large number of 
Russian engineers and technicians and thus helps keep Russia's nuclear industry alive—
something Putin hopes will help not only earn Russia much needed hard currency but also help in 
the high tech development of the Russian economy. Finally, by standing firm on Bushehr, Putin 
could demonstrate to domestic audiences Russia's independent policy vis-à-vis the U.S. as both 
the Duma and Presidential elections neared. 
 
Yet such a policy held dangers for Moscow. First, as noted above, it served to alienate the United 
States, despite constant Russian protestations that the Bushehr reactor would only be used for 
peaceful purposes. Second, especially as revelations emerged about the extent of the Iranian 
nuclear program, Moscow ran the danger that either the U.S. or Israel, might attack the Bushehr 
reactor. The problem became especially serious for Russia in December 2002 when it was 
revealed in a series of satellite photographs that, in addition to Bushehr, Iran was building two 
new nuclear facilities, one a centrifuge plant near the city of Natanz and the other a heavy water 
plant near the city of Arak. Initially Russia downplayed the development, with the Director of 
Minatom, Alexander Rumantsev, stating that the photos taken of the plants were not sufficient to 
determine their nature, and, in any case, that Russia had nothing to do with the two plants. Other 
representatives of Minatom said Russia was ready to supply the long-awaited nuclear fuel to 
Tehran—but only if the Iranians guaranteed return of the spent fuel to Moscow. Rumantsev, 
however, said Russia was ready without conditions to supply nuclear fuel to Iran.[31] 
 
By February 2003, however, Rumantsev was hedging his position, noting "at this moment in time: 
Iran did not have the capability to build nuclear weapons.[32] By March 2003 with an IAEA team 
visiting the two plants, Rumantsev had further changed his position and asserted that Russia 
could not tell whether Iran was secretly developing nuclear weapons: "While Russia is helping 




Following its initial successes in the Iraq war, the U.S. stepped up its pressure on Russia to halt 
the Iranian nuclear weapons program. In response, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov noted in 
an Interfax interview at the end of May 2003 that Russia wanted all Iranian nuclear programs to 
be under the supervision of the IAEA. 
 
Then, following the Bush-Putin talks in St. Petersburg in early June when Bush was at the height 
of his international influence, Putin asserted that the positions of Russia and the U.S. on Iran 
were closer than people thought. However, he added that "the pretext of an Iranian nuclear 
weapons program (could be used) as an instrument of unfair competition" against Russian 
companies.[34] 
 
By early June 2003 it appeared that the U.S. was making two demands on Russia, vis-à-vis the 
Bushehr reactor. First, while the U.S. wanted Russia to end all support for Bushehr, at the 
minimum, the U.S. argued that Moscow should not supply any nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor 
unless Iran agreed to send all used fuel back to Moscow. Second, Moscow should also withhold 
the nuclear fuel until Iran signed an additional protocol with the IAEA permitting that agency 
unannounced visits to all Iranian nuclear facilities. On the latter issue, both the G-8 (of which 
Russia is a member) and the EU have also been pressuring Iran. Indeed, the G-8 statement 
issued in early June noted: "We urge Iran to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol 
without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination 
of this country's nuclear program."[35]  
 
The question, of course, was not only how far Iran would go to comply, but also how far Russia 
would go to pressure Iran. In this there appeared to be some initial confusion in Moscow. While 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair asserted that Moscow had agreed not to deliver nuclear fuel until 
Iran signed the IAEA protocol, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko, 
stated that Moscow would only freeze construction on the Bushehr plant if Iran refused to agree 
to return all spent nuclear fuel to Russia, and that Iran was not required to sign the protocol, 
because "the protocol is an agreement that is signed on a voluntary basis."[36] 
 
Meanwhile, perhaps to deflect some of the U.S. pressure, Minatom Minister Alexander 
Rumanstev announced on June 3, 2003 that the Bushehr reactor would be completed in 2005, 
not 2004 as originally planned. While he blamed the delay on the need to replace the reactor's 
original German parts, it could well be that this was an important gesture to the U.S. 
Then, on September 12, the IAEA, of which Russia is a member, gave Tehran a deadline of 
October 31 to provide full information about its nuclear program to show that it was not secretly 
building nuclear weapons, and furthermore urged Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment program. 
While the tough wording of the message prompted the walkout of the Iranian delegation from the 
Vienna IAEA meeting, the question now became how Russia would react to the situation. 
Interestingly enough, at the time, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak tried to soft 
pedal the IAEA report by saying Iran should not see the October 31st deadline as an 
ultimatum.[37] However, in September a dispute between Russia and Iran had broken out over 
who would pay for the return of the spent fuel from the reactor, with Iran demanding that Russia 
pay for it and Moscow refusing. Complicating matters further for Putin on the eve of his visit to the 
U.S. in late September, was the U.S. sanctioning of a Russian arms firm (Tula Instrument Design 
Bureau) for selling laser-guided artillery shells to Iran. 
 
Fortunately for Putin, Bush's position at the time of the summit was considerably weaker than it 
had been when the two leaders last met in June. As noted above, guerrilla warfare had erupted in 
Iraq and the U.S. was having trouble dealing with it. Indeed, Washington turned to the U.N. in an 
effort to get additional troops, along with monetary aid to rebuild Iraq. Along with a sputtering 
American economy, Iraq had become a major issue in U.S. politics, as Bush's standing in U.S. 
polls dropped sharply. Consequently, while Bush raised the issue of Iran with Putin, the most he 
could extract from the Russian leader was the somewhat vague statement that "It is our 
conviction that we shall give a clear but respectful signal to Iran about the necessity to continue 
and expand its cooperation with the IAEA."[38] In addition, Bush proved unable to get Putin to 
agree to cease construction on the Bushehr reactor. 
 
 
The ball, however, was taken out of Moscow's hands by the EU, which sent a delegation to 
Tehran in late October. The delegation succeeded in extracting from Iran in return for a promise 
of high tech trade cooperation, its promise to temporarily stop enriching uranium and sign the 
additional protocol as well as to inform the IAEA of its past nuclear activities. Moscow hailed the 
Iranian action and the head of the Iranian Security Council Hassan Rowhani came to Moscow on 
November 11th to formally announce that Tehran was temporarily suspending the enrichment of 
uranium and was sending that day a letter to the IAEA agreeing to the additional protocol.[39] 
Moscow exploited the visit saying that Iran was now in full compliance with the IAEA, and Putin 
said that now Russia and Iran would continue their nuclear cooperation.[40] Indeed, Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Alexandr Yakoveko, eying the possibility of the sale of additional reactors to 
Tehran, something discussed during the Iranian delegation's visit, said Russia would now "do its 
utmost to expedite the completion of Bushehr."[41] 
 
In part because of Russian (and EU) pressure, the Board of Governors of the IAEA in November 
2003 decided not to refer Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council. Nonetheless it did 
warn Iran against developing nuclear weapons and threatened to consider "all options available" 
if Iran continued to conceal information about its nuclear facilities.[42] The U.S. took a tougher 
stance with John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 
warning that the U.S. was ready to use all options against rogue states believed to be developing 
weapons of mass destruction. Bolton also voiced skepticism that Iran would abide by its 
commitments to the IAEA.[43] 
 
Bolton's skepticism soon proved to be well taken because less than two months later the 
revelations about Pakistan's nuclear proliferation policies, including to Iran, led IAEA Chief 
Muhammed ElBaradei to warn about the collapse of the non-proliferation system, and the U.S. to 
call for closing a loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to prevent countries, such as Iran, 
from acquiring materials for their national atomic energy programs that could be used to build 
nuclear weapons.[44] In addition, IAEA inspectors found that Iran had hidden, among other 
things, an advanced P-2 centrifuge system that could be used for enriching uranium, along with a 
program for producing polonium 210 which could be used as a neutron initiator for nuclear 
weapons.[45] 
 
Meanwhile, as these revelations emerged, Moscow seemed confused on how to react. Minatom's 
Deputy Minister, Valery Govorukhin, played down ElBaradei's warning of the possible collapse of 
the international nuclear non-proliferation system, and hailed Iran's cooperation with the 
IAEA.[46] By contrast, however, his superior Alexander Rumantsev, supported ElBaradei, calling 
the situation "extremely unpleasant" and went so far as to say that Russia, along with other 
countries, was going to give "active consideration as to whether work on the establishment of 
national fuel cycles should be terminated in non-nuclear countries"[47]—something that would 
have struck a serious blow against Iran's nuclear aspirations. At the same time, however, the 
U.S. during a visit to Moscow in late January 2004 by John Bolton, proved unable to get Russia's 
agreement to cooperation with an international effort to intercept shipments of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons. 
 
This rather confused Russian reaction to the Iranian nuclear effort provides a point of departure 
for an examination of how Moscow could become more of a partner to the U.S. in curbing Iran's 
nuclear weapons production program, over and above apparently delaying the completion of the 
Bushehr reactor, something Tehran has been complaining about.[48] First, Moscow must support 
U.S. efforts to stop the establishment of national nuclear fuel cycles in non-nuclear countries such 
as Iran. Second, Russia must join the U.S. effort to intercept WMD shipments in the air and on 
sea. Third, Moscow must, if it provides the fuel for Bushehr, not only demand the return of all 
spent fuel to Moscow, but also agree to the stationing of international inspectors at Bushehr to 
ensure that no fuel is secretly taken away to be enriched in Iran's centrifuge program. Finally, 
Russia must crack down hard on 'rogue' companies that have been selling nuclear fuel and 
equipment to Iran, as has recently been revealed.[49] 
 
If these actions are taken, Moscow, albeit belatedly, could begin to prove its trustworthiness as a 
partner for the U.S. Whether Moscow would agree to take these steps, however, remains to be 
seen. 
Conclusions 
On the basis of Russian behavior in the war on terrorism, Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Iraq and Iran, 
can it be concluded that Russia is a suitable partner for the United States, as Putin has claimed? 
On the basis of Russian foreign policy behavior in these areas under Putin, the answer would 
appear to be in the negative. In the war on terrorism, while Russia supplied intelligence 
information to the U.S. and acquiesced in the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia, the 
reasons were not so much to help the U.S. as to aid Moscow in its own war on terrorism and, 
when given the opportunity to score political points at America's expense at the OIC conference 
in October 2003, Putin did not hesitate to do so, thus revealing the continuing thread of anti-
Americanism and multipolarism evident in Putin's diplomacy even as he claims to be a partner 
with the U.S. 
 
In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Putin has chosen to side with the EU rather than the U.S., 
on such questions as dealing with PLO leader Yasser Arafat and supporting Israeli Prime Minister 
Sharon's policies including creating the security fence and considering a unilateral pull-out from 
Gaza. 
 
In the case of Iraq, Moscow sided with France and Germany, rather than the U.S. in opposing the 
Anglo-American attack of March 2003. Even worse Moscow's secretive supply of arms and its 
caustic behavior during the war, were clearly not the acts of a partner. While, after the war, 
Russia did support UNSC Resolution #1483, and, in response to U.S. requests, did offer to waive 
part of Iraq's debt, these actions were taken primarily to enhance Russia's business prospects in 
Iraq, not to help the U.S. 
 
Finally, while the leadership in Moscow appears increasingly confused as to how to handle the 
revelations about Iran's atomic energy program which increasingly appears aimed at developing 
nuclear weapons, Moscow has not take decisive action in curbing its nuclear assistance to 
Tehran. A desire for hard currency, jobs for Russia's nuclear engineers, and a wish to 
demonstrate its independence of the U.S. seem to dominate Putin's thinking. 
 
These observations indicate that despite all the talk of a Russian-American partnership Moscow 
has not behaved as a true partner. Where the two countries interests have coincided, as in the 
war on terrorism and in stabilizing post-war Iraq, the Russia and the U.S. have worked in parallel. 
However, in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the struggle for influence in the Muslim world, 
and Iran, the two countries have acted at cross-purposes. 
 
In sum, therefore, it can be argued that Russia has emerged, in the Putin era, not as a partner to 
the U.S. but more as a competitor. In that sense, it has adopted a position somewhat similar to 
that of France. However, there is one central difference. France is a liberal democracy with which 
the United States shares common values. By contrast Russia's democracy is rapidly eroding. 
True partners tend to share values. In this sense not only has Putin's Russia demonstrated 
through its behavior that it is not a genuine partner of the U.S., it has also done so through 
scorning the values of a democracy. 
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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